Source: Revolving Door Lobbyists Conclusion: "In this paper we show that ex-government officials extract monetary rents in terms of generated lobbying revenue from their personal connections to elected representatives. In particular, we find that lobbyists with past working experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24% drop in revenue - around $177,000- when their ex-employers leaves office. The eff ect is immediate, it is discontinuous around the exit period and it persists in the long-term. We show that our fi ndings are not consistent with the existence of shared trends between politician and lobbyist, 'swansong e ffects' or reverse causality. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful elected officials, the drop in revenue increases with the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the Senator immediately prior to leaving office. For lobbyists connected to US Representatives we fi nd similar if weaker e ffects. Overall, our findings suggest that access to serving officials is a scarce asset that commands a premium in the market for lobbying services."