Tuesday, September 1, 2020
Sunday, December 31, 2017
Friday, October 23, 2015
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Random charts - drone strikes
Saturday, November 1, 2014
Random charts - Afghanistan
Saturday, September 27, 2014
Rabbit from a hat?
Well, the administration manages to get a resolution to the Afghan presidential tussle - Ashraf Ghani to be President, with Abdullah Abdullah to some newly created position in a 'power sharing' agreement of some sort...
Tuesday, December 31, 2013
Gains...
Sunday, December 1, 2013
Random charts - Afghan opium
Monday, December 24, 2012
Saturday, October 13, 2012
The mother lode?
Saturday, June 9, 2012
Not much changes




Fast forward to 2012, the basic pattern remains, although apologies and cash payoffs have been added to the mix.
First word came of 18 deaths due to an ISAF air strike, subsequently confirmed by Afghan officials. First ISAF denies, providing a detailed counter-narrative:
"An Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation to detain a Taliban leader in Baraki Barak district, Logar province, today. The leader plans and participates in attacks against Afghan and coalition forces throughout the province. He also commands multiple insurgents and acquires weapons for use in insurgent attacks against Afghan and coalition troops. During the operation, insurgents attacked the Afghan and coalition troops with small-arms fire and a grenade. The security force returned fire and requested a precision airstrike. While conducting a follow-on assessment, the security force discovered two women who had sustained non-life-threatening injuries. The security force provided medical assistance and transported both women to an ISAF medical facility for treatment. As a result of the operation, multiple insurgents were killed and the Afghan and coalition security force seized several weapons and a quantity of explosives..."
Later, while still "unable to confirm or deny" ISAF announces an investigation will be done.
Then an admission of sorts - "...The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has completed its initial assessment of the circumstances surrounding its June 6 mission to detain a Taliban leader in Baraki Barak district, Logar province. ISAF confirms that in addition to the insurgents killed during the operation, it’s also responsible for the unintended, but nonetheless tragic, death of Afghan civilians... ISAF continues to investigate the unfortunate circumstances surrounding this airstrike and remains committed to taking any and all appropriate actions to minimize the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future..." and General John R. Allen, commander, International Security Assistance Force, flew to the area to personally apologize.
Now, it must be admitted that the admission and apology only took two days, as opposed to the weeks or months it often seems to take. Some marginal improvement, however not much has changed....
Sunday, February 19, 2012
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Random chart - Iraq, Afghan tribal differences
"... Most US personnel that are serving in Afghanistan have already served a tour in Iraq and are accustomed to doing things “the Iraq way”. Many people are trying to apply the lessons learned in Iraq to Afghanistan, which in many cases is inappropriate. AF2 wants to provide a product to US units to compare and contrast Iraqi tribal structure and Pashtun tribal structure to prevent future missteps by US forces.
The notion of applying ideas that worked in Iraq to Afghanistan is fraught with problems. The “lessons don’t transfer directly,” according to John Nagl, one of the authors of the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). William McCallister, an expert advisor to the Marine Corps on tribal dynamics in Iraq2 said he is “not a fan of taking the Anbar experience and creating TTPs” for a Pashtun context.
The reasons behind this are legion. For one, the historical experiences of Iraqi and Pashtun societies are so dissimilar as to make comparing them difficult, if not impossible. For another, the specific circumstances of each warzone—one a sectarian conflict, the other a fractured society handling an international insurgency—doesn’t allow for easy generalization between the two.
Furthermore, each society is fundamentally different on a structural level. In Iraq, leadership is in a sense “institutionalized,” or “codified” in the sense that there is a set and identifiable structure for community leadership to interact with each other and with the State. In Afghanistan, however, that system is neither “institutionalized” nor “codified” in any real sense; therefore, structures of community leadership and power relationships within and between tribal groups and the state are much more ad hoc and cannot be discussed in a general sense. Comparing these two societies side-by-side demonstrates this, and shows just how difficult it is to draw lessons from one to the other..."
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Or not quite... (updated 2/11)

Hmm, as suspected, this turns out to be a slight (?) exaggeration. An Army Lieutenant Colonel recently penned an article - Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down - which notes the "discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground" and takes senior military leaders to task... Some brief quotes:
"... What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground... I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level... I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base..." A must read.
Updated 2/11:
Here's a link to the unclassified version of the report: Dereliction of Duty II: Senior Military Leader’s Loss of Integrity Wounds Afghan War Effort84-page PDF
Sunday, February 5, 2012
Brief update II (Afghan fauna)
Here are a couple of National Geographic articles with additional information and photos:
Sunday, January 29, 2012
Eh?

OK, so the British agreement actually does appear to go out another decade, and I supposed you could called it two decades if you count backwards to 2011... However, France agreeing to "two decades" of support doesn't seem quite supported by the body of the article (as opposed to its headline).
Saturday, December 24, 2011
Sunday, September 11, 2011
Great quotes
... Once Afghanistan has been dealt with, America should turn its attention to Iraq. It will probably not be possible to remove Saddam quickly without a U.S. invasion and occupation--though it will hardly require half a million men, since Saddam's army is much diminished since the Gulf War, and we will probably have plenty of help from Iraqis, once they trust that we intend to finish the job this time. Once we have deposed Saddam, we can impose an American-led, international regency in Baghdad, to go along with the one in Kabul. With American seriousness and credibility thus restored, we will enjoy fruitful cooperation from the region's many opportunists, who will show a newfound eagerness to be helpful in our larger task of rolling up the international terror network that threatens us... "
- Max Boot, October 15th, 2011
Sunday, September 4, 2011
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
Great quotes
- Marine Gen. John R. Allen, the top commander in Afghanistan

































