Back in 2002 an earlier Nuclear
Posture Review was completed and in March of that year I wrote a note about it,
titled: "NPR - Not Your Father's Public Radio." That is reproduced
below (note: fifteen years on many of the original links are no longer
working!).
My conclusion at the time? That the
NPR "seemed somewhat confused"
and "on the one hand it discusses doing
research to develop smaller, tactical nuclear devices (implicitly agreeing that
the majority of the weapons in the current nuclear arsenal are weapons without
suitable targets, present or future) while at the same time keeping these
increasingly redundant weapons."
Fast forward to 2017 and
an early draft of the NPR has been leaked. Reaction has
been immediate, and for the most part entirely predictable. On the one side
nods of affirmation; on the other those who believe that nuclear weapons have
no use and should be eliminated, worr that the pendulum is going in the
wrong direction. And, supporting the "anti" side's critique/view,
many reflexively opposed to President Trump, waxing nostalgic about President
Obama's perceived view about the elimination of nuclear weapons. (Note: I say "perceived"
because this blogger has long believed there was a serious gap between Obama's
nuclear weapons rhetoric and actual actions, for example see here, here, and here.)
My verdict? This NPR
hearkens back in spirit to the earlier 2002 NPR and is not a huge break from
the past. However, like the earlier 2002 NPR it too is
"confused" and continues (in vain) the search for additional reasons
to have these weapons.
Some reactions to the leaked 2017 NPR:
P.S. One (small but illustrative) example of the incoherence in the document, the assertion that "U.S. nuclear capabilities..." contribute to "... the deterrence of... non-nuclear aggression." This blogger has never seen a persuasive example of this!
NPR - Not Your Father's Public Radio
(originally written March 21st, 2002)
In 2001 when Congress passed the National Defense Authorization
Act, the legislation required that the Secretary of Defense in consultation
with the Secretary of Energy conduct a comprehensive review of US nuclear
forces. They were to develop a long-range plan for the modernization of US
strategic nuclear forces. This review is known as the Nuclear Posture Review -
NPR. This NPR, the second (the first was in 1994), was completed and submitted
to Congress 1/8/2002. The majority of the report was classified, but the
unclassified portions were presented in a DoD news briefing - Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review
In March the classified portion was leaked and became public NPR excerpts on globalsecurity.org, immediately
causing a furor by naming countries that might be nuclear targets, and also
seeming to endorse the use of nuclear weapons. The story was broken by a couple
of articles in the LA Times.
The following links can be used to examine the topic of nuclear
weapons:
Since the reports surfaced the administration has backtracked a bit,
saying this report was about possibilities/scenarios and not doctrine. However,
it is evident that consideration is being paid to the possible development and
use of tactical nuclear weapons. And even before this one could occasionally
hear calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons e.g. when the US was
attacking the
Tora Bora cave complex in Afghanistan a Republican Indiana
congressman suggested that the use of nuclear weapons should be considered to
destroy and seal up the caves.
- So, what could nuclear weapons
be used for (putting aside for the moment arguments about other aspects of
their use)? It is hard to see any practical use for nuclear weapons that
could not be accomplished by the use of conventional, non-nuclear
firepower except perhaps the destruction of hardened, subterranean
targets. The graphic shows the possible use of an existing
earth-penetrating nuclear weapon. However, the existing versions of these
weapons (e.g. the B61-11) don't have very great penetration, and certainly
not enough for all the fallout to be contained in the ground and not
dispersed through the air - experiments in Nevada in the '60's showed that
for this a (mere) 5 kiloton warhead would need to be 650 feet deep, and a
100 kiloton warhead would have to be 1300 feet underground to avoid a
significant amount of radioactive material being vented. Thus new weapons
would have to be developed, which would require testing. The US has had a
moratorium on testing since 1992. President Clinton signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, though the Senate did not ratify
it. There is also a 1994 law prohibiting research and development of
nuclear weapons smaller than 5 kilotons. Meanwhile advances in bunker
busting conventional bombs (e.g. the GBU-28 that is supposedly capable of
destroying silo-based ICBMs) make this nuclear option much less
compelling.
- On a different level, it is
almost impossible to make a case for when nuclear weapons might be used
other than in response to a 'traditional' mass nuclear attack from a
nuclear nation such as China or Russia. There are no credible first use
scenarios against a non-nuclear power. A nuclear response against a nation
in answer to a nuclear (or biological, radioactive, or chemical, etc.)
terrorist attack (even if sponsored by a government) also provides no
positive advantage, given that all these scenarios can be replied to using
an overwhelming conventional response (since the US has the means and the
ability to deliver mass destruction wherever it wishes). And the down side
is that the first 'routine' use of a nuclear weapon immediately takes
these weapons out of the "weapons of mass destruction" category
and makes them simply another military option in the arsenal of options.
This would 'legitimize' the use of these weapons, destroy years of
non-proliferation efforts, and give the green light to nations around the
world to develop their own nuclear weapons. This 'legitimizing' effect
would be even greater if the US use was not in response to a WMD attack,
but simply against a natural feature (mountain caves) or hardened target.
Given the above, it is hard to understand where the NPR and the
administration seem to be sending US nuclear doctrine. Another confusing thing
is the proposed "reduction" of the US nuclear force. President Bush
and Russian President Putin discussed significant cutbacks in nuclear warheads,
and the administration speaks of the US reducing its nuclear arsenal from its
current level of approximately 10,650 warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by 2012. This
reduction allows for a more than sufficient nuclear deterrent, while
recognizing that the previous levels are unnecessary given the changed world
situation. However, this was followed by the announcement that the warheads
reduced would not be decommissioned and destroyed but would be put in storage.
Thus the "reduction" from 10,650 to 2,000 would be
achieved by changing the terms of the debate - while currently all warheads are
counted, under the administration's plan only "operationally deployed
warheads" are counted while ignoring all those in testing, being
overhauled or upgraded, or in storage. If you continue to count all the
categories the US stock will only be reduced from 10,650 to approximately 9,980
by 2012 (see graph). While the reduction in deployed warheads will result in
reduced risk it is hard to understand why the 'reduced' warheads will be kept
in storage. The 2,200 active warheads are already many times more than might
ever be needed, so it is difficult to see a circumstance under which the other
warheads might be pulled out of storage and used!
In conclusion, the administration's NPR seems somewhat confused.
On the one hand it discusses doing research to develop smaller, tactical
nuclear devices (implicitly agreeing that the majority of the weapons in the
current nuclear arsenal are weapons without suitable targets, present or
future) while at the same time keeping these increasingly redundant weapons.
