Thursday, October 2, 2008

Great quotes...

Photo credit: CNN

"We don't have a lot of leeway on time. One of the individuals in the caucus today talked about a major insurance company. A major insurance company -- one with a name that everyone knows that's on the verge of going bankrupt. That's what this is all about" - Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, (NV) on Wednesday while pressing for passage of the bailout.

Later in the day a Reid spokesman clarified that the senator was "speaking broadly" and not referring to any particular insurance company. The next day (Thursday) folks already jittery about the prospects of these companies drove their stock prices sharply downward...

Candidates Leave Campaign Trail, Head to DC for Bailout Vote
Insurers dive on Reid's 'bankrupt' quote

Wall Street vs. Main Street - II

Another study, this one by economists at The Federal Reserve Board, look at "... the relationship between the health of the financial sector and the rest of the economy..." Crunching 30 years of data, they come to a conclusion:

"The results in this paper suggest that financial stability is connected to corporate investment, and that a deterioration in the health of the financial sector can act as a restraint on macroeconomic performance. We argue that one reason for this is that changes in financial institution health leads these institutions to tighten lending conditions and we find evidence consistent with this explanation. In addition, to a direct effect on investment, we also find that variations in the health of the financial sector also seem to amplify shocks to other parts of the economy."

Hmm, so maybe all the "Main Street" folks out there clamoring that the "Wall Street" folks should be allowed to go down the tubes should reconsider...

Distress in the Financial Sector and Economic Activity

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Wall Street vs. Main Street - I


A group of economists did a study to see if sub-prime lending caused the housing price bubble... From the abstract of their study: "Significant policy attention and concern has been focused recently upon the extent, degree, and duration of the “housing bubble” associated with the sharp rise and then drop in home prices over the period 1998-2008. The widespread availability of sub-prime and other alternative mortgage products during this period, while arguably increasing homeownership rates (at least temporarily), has been broadly blamed for these market outcomes. In this paper we empirically investigate the validity of this proposition against several other alternative explanations."

Well, they build their model and crunch their data and conclude that:
  • Up to 2003 housing prices were mostly dictated by the fundamentals e.g. population, growth, unemployment, incomes, etc.
  • However, after 2003 fundamentals no longer explained housing prices as well.
  • Sub=prime loans per se did not cause the bubble.
  • Finally, they indicate that as the two GSEs (i.e. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) essentially were out of the business from 2004 to 2006, the asset-backed securities (ABS) that came in and filled the gap contributed the most to the run up in housing prices. They say "... The most important and heretofore unrecognized impact of lending patterns on subsequent house price returns was found to originate with the regime-shift which occurred in early 2004, with the squeezing out of the GSE‘s from the market, both because of political, regulatory, and economic factors. The resulting reshuffling of supply of mortgage capital in the market, resulted in both a record increase in total lending volume after 2003 and a substantial substitution of alternative private instruments for conventional conforming GSE loans... The dominant policy conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of this paper is that the existence of subprime loan products alone may not merit primary blame for the problems currently being experienced in the housing and mortgage markets. Rather, political and regulatory actions and economic conditions -- which led to a disruption in traditional flows of credit into the market and permitted not only new instrument designs, but also weaker underwriting standards, to flow in great volumes into the void – may be deemed complicit, if not dominant in precipitating the subsequent series of adverse events."
Of course, when things started to go bad the ABS share feel off in a hurry, and the share of mortgages via the GSEs exploded... Bottom line: Wall Street did it :) However, as mentioned in 'Crashing the party' Main Street participated in full and was fully complicit...

Subprime lending and the housing bubble: Tail wags dog?

Great quotes...


"Two groups that stand between us and the barbarians at the gate, It's you and organized labor." - Joe Biden speaking at a fund-raiser arranged by a group of trial lawyers in Washington, D.C. last week. He also said that he had "done more than any other senator" for trial lawyers.

Whoo!


In the middle of this crisis/meltdown etc. the Nobel prize in economics is set to be announced on October the 13th... a Monday :)

Yet another plan (Soros)

George Soros makes his suggestion in an article in the Financial Times (Note: free subscription required). An extract is below. He proposes that the government (TARP) look over the banks' books, figure out how much capital they need, and then inject capital to make them whole, while taking an equity position... Presumably this involves also valuing the toxic assets so that they can be marked to market (otherwise how do you know how much capital it would be necessary to inject?) while leaving the banks in ownership of those toxic assets. Far be it for this blogger to argue against a proposal from someone who knows this stuff inside and out (and is worth billions), but he thought that one of the huge criticisms of the administration's proposals was that it is very difficult to get to the value of the toxic waste (thus the concern that the TARP would overpay...). Under this plan, if the bank examiners undervalue them, then the TARP has to inject more money, while if they overvalue the toxic assets they risk not injecting sufficient capital! Also, this blogger's impression is that the value of the toxic assets is a moving target, as time goes by and mortgage defaults and delinquencies continue to increase the toxic assets continue to go down in value.

Thus, under the Soros plan, when the examiners come in, check the books, inject capital and take an equity position in the bank all is well. However, what is to prevent this from having to be repeated in six months?


Soros Article Extract:

Instead of just purchasing troubled assets the bulk of the funds ought to be used to recapitalise the banking system. Funds injected at the equity level are more high-powered than funds used at the balance sheet level by a minimal factor of twelve - effectively giving the government $8,400bn to re-ignite the flow of credit. In practice, the effect would be even greater because the injection of government funds would also attract private capital. The result would be more economic recovery and the chance for taxpayers to profit from the recovery.

This is how it would work. The Treasury secretary would rely on bank examiners rather than delegate implementation of Tarp to Wall Street firms. The bank examiners would establish how much additional equity capital each bank needs in order to be properly capitalised according to existing capital requirements. If managements could not raise equity from the private sector they could turn to Tarp.

Tarp would invest in preference shares with warrants attached. The preference shares would carry a low coupon (say 5 per cent) so that banks would find it profitable to continue lending, but shareholders would pay a heavy price because they would be diluted by the warrants; they would be given the right, however, to subscribe on Tarp’s terms. The rights would be tradeable and the secretary of the Treasury would be instructed to set the terms so that the rights would have a positive value.

Private investors, including me, are likely to jump at the opportunity. The recapitalised banks would be allowed to increase their leverage, so they would resume lending. Limits on bank leverage could be imposed later, after the economy has recovered. If the funds were used in this way, the recapitalisation of the banking system could be achieved with less than $500bn of public funds.

A revised emergency legislation could also provide more help to homeowners. It could require the Treasury to provide cheap financing for mortgage securities whose terms have been renegotiated, based on the Treasury’s cost of borrowing. Mortgage service companies could be prohibited from charging fees on foreclosures, but they could expect the owners of the securities to provide incentives for renegotiation as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are already doing.

Banks deemed to be insolvent would not be eligible for recapitalization by the capital infusion programme, but would be taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The FDIC would be recapitalised by $200bn as a temporary measure. FDIC, in turn could remove the $100,000 limit on insured deposits. A revision of the emergency legislation along these lines would be more equitable, have a better chance of success, and cost taxpayers less in the long run.

Ouch - II

Photo credit: Getty Images

Ouch looked at Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur's (D-OH) version of what should be done re the financial crisis. Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) sent a letter to Senators Reid, McConnell, and Dodd, Speaker Pelosi, and Representatives Boehner, Frank, and Bachus, "... asking them to ensure there are clear mechanisms for long-term transparency, accountability, and reform in the current financial recovery package..." The letter has number of oversight measures re what to do longer term to prevent future crises, but has nothing re what to do about the current one...